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participation as a result of the financial aid provided by the G.I. Bill. These groups may have lacked the academic readiness for college programs and supply constraints in higher education may have limited their enrollment.
Our research questions are twofold. First, we explore the extent to which World War II service and the availability of G.I. benefits had similar behavioral effects on the collegiate attainment of black and white men. Then, among blacks, we look at the extent to which state of birth, and particularly location in a southern state, leads to differential collegiate outcomes. The analytic strategy in this paper uses variation over time in the fraction of men serving from each birth cohort to identify the effects of military service and the availability of G.I. benefits on educational attainment. The first section of the paper presents institutional detail on military service and educational opportunities for blacks in relation to whites during the World War II era.
The next section summarizes the relevant theoretical questions and outlines the empirical strategy. The empirical section of this analysis points to a significantly positive impact of World War II and the availability of G.I. benefits on the educational attainment of white men and black men born outside the segregated southern states. However, for black veterans likely to be limited to the South in their educational choices, the G.I. Bill had little effect on collegiate outcomes.
The concluding section presents a discussion of the empirical findings and considers the policy implications of these results.
I. Black Americans, World War II Military Service, and the G.I. Bill
A. Race and Military Service in World War II
The politics and practice of minority participation in the military were contentious issues as World War II approached. Before the start of the war, the black press and the NAACP launched the "Double V" campaign, urging black Americans to work toward victories over Jim Crow at home and fascism abroad. In late September 1940, President Roosevelt met with a delegation of black leaders to discuss the administration's defense policy and the utilization of blacks in the military, as well as minority group support for the administration's policies. Shortly after that meeting, on October 9, the Roosevelt administration released a statement reaffirming its support for the inclusion of blacks in the military in proportion to their representation in the population while continuing the segregation of black and white troops in organized military activities (Smith, 1987) .
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As the war approached, the capacity of the military to employ black servicemen was quite limited. For example, in 1940 there were only 6 black units in the military, which accounted for only 4,450 soldiers (Flynn, 1993) . To maintain segregation, the military branches were required to build additional housing, mess halls, and other facilities for black servicemen. Because of initial placement barriers, few black men were accepted to the military through voluntary enlistment in the early years of the war.
When manpower demand intensified as the war progressed, voluntary enlistment was largely eliminated and date of birth became a primary determinant of induction. All men were required to register with local draft boards at age 18, after which they were classified as "service eligible" or deferred from service. It is this classification by local draft boards that introduces the significant problem of selection in measuring the effects of World War II and the availability of G.I. benefits on the educational attainment of veterans. Reasons for deferment included mental and physical deficiencies, illiteracy, and employment in industries vital to the war effort.
Differences by race in these classification rates suggest potential differences in the nature of the selection effects associated with military service. For instance, whites were much more likely to receive occupational deferments and blacks more likely to be deferred for reasons of illiteracy or "mental deficiency." Table 1 shows selective service classification rates for black and white registrants by age in 1945. Among registrants ages 19-25, black men were 2.25 more likely that white men to receive deferments under section IV-F for physical or mental unfitness. Of those deferred for service in 1944, 33.5 percent of blacks and 8.0 percent of whites were rejected for low scores on the reading and writing examination (Selective Service System, 1948, Table 191, p. 664) . conflicts by birth cohort for the first half of the 20th century, measured at quarterly intervals.
Among men designated service eligible, date of birth was significantly related to the probability of induction as the selective service drafted "oldest eligible" men first. For men turning 18 during the war, those born in the interval 1923-25 faced a relatively high risk of induction relative to those born in later years. For black men, absolute levels of military participation were somewhat lower than for whites, with a peak share of 66 percent reached among men born in the third quarter of 1922. Among blacks and whites, the proportion of each cohort serving in the military slid rapidly after the 1926 birth cohort. Ultimately, more than 1 million black men served in the military during World War II.
2 the selection of troops and the execution of the law (MacGregor, 1981) .
2 The majority of these men served in the Army and the 885,945 black men inducted to this branch accounted for 10.9% of the men inducted in the Army during the war. The Navy inducted 153,224 black men, which accounted for about 10% of the inductions in this branch, while the Marine Corp did not admit blacks until June of 1942 (Selective Service System, 1948 .
B. G.I. Benefits and Educational Opportunities for World War II Veterans
The unprecedented support for the education of returning World War II veterans provided by the Serviceman's Readjustment Act (Public Law 346, 1944) , known more generally as the G.I. Bill, was notably race-neutral in its statutory terms. Educational benefits extended from a minimum of one year to four years, depending on length of service and age, and men serving between September 1940 and July 1947 were eligible. In addition to providing annual tuition payments of up to $500, the bill also provided a monthly cash allowance.
3 A notable feature of the program was that benefits were awarded to individuals rather than institutions, allowing veterans to use them for any educational or training programs to which they were accepted. G.I.
benefits not only covered enrollment at colleges and universities, but also provided opportunities for vocational, technical, and apprenticeship training. In fact, the majority of veterans who received training under the World War II G.I. Bill participated in non-collegiate and on-the-job programs (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).
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The provisions of the G.I. Bill as signed into law by President Roosevelt on June 22, 1944 provided for a monthly stipend of $50 for single veterans and $75 for married veterans, as well as the payment of tuition, books and supplies up to $500. All veterans serving 90 days with a record of honorable discharge were eligible for one year of educational benefits, with veterans receiving educational benefits matching years of service 1:1 up to a maximum of four years of benefit eligibility. In December of 1945, the G.I. Bill was amended to increase the length of the period over which a veteran could initiate and complete education, eliminate restrictions on educational benefits for older veterans, and increase the level of monthly stipend to $65 for single veterans and to $90 for veterans with dependents. The nominal stipend levels were raised again in April of 1948 to $75 for single veterans, $105 for married veterans, and $120 for veterans with children.
4 Men chose a wide array of programs beyond collegiate-level training. Overall, black men were less likely to enroll in college-level programs than whites. Data from the Survey of Veterans show more than 28 percent of whites in the 1923-28 birth cohorts enrolled in collegiate level training, while less than 12 percent of returning black veterans chose this option. Black men were, in turn, relatively over-represented in the range of programs comprising the "other" training and schooling category as well as high school-level training.
However, there is some evidence that black men in the south had a particularly difficult time gaining access to vocational and on-the-job training programs with G.I. benefits. Southern Veterans Administration centers employed few black counselors and were generally unforthcoming in providing services to black veterans (Onkst, 1998) . For example, Onkst cites evidence noting that in March of 1946 only 6 of the 246 on-the-job training programs in Atlanta for veterans had black participation. Another report of the period (Bolte and Harris, 1947) notes that of 102,200 veterans receiving on-the-job training in 12 southern states, only 7,700 were black, despite the fact that about 1 in 3 veterans in the area were black.
Very little information is available providing direct evidence on the comparative utilization rate of G.I. benefits among black and white veterans. Limited data from the Survey of Veterans presented in Table 2 suggest that black veterans turning 18 during World War II were at least as likely as white men to use G.I. benefits, although the number of months of G.I.
educational benefits appears to be smaller for blacks than whites. One study conducted by the Information and Education Division of the Army in 1944 just after the announcement of the G.I.
Bill showed the remarkable power of the benefits in changing educational aspirations. Prior to the announcement of benefits, only 7 percent of enlisted men indicated that they planned further training or education after the war. After the announcement, 29 percent of white enlisted men and 43 percent of black enlisted men expressed a definite interest in education and training after the war (Brown, 1946) .
It is likely that educational opportunities for veterans returning from World War II varied with race and geography. Southern states maintained explicitly segregated systems of education in the 1940s and this affected the tertiary system of education, as well as the primary and secondary levels. Moreover, access to information about veterans' benefits and advising services may have differed with racial groups. A statutory provision of the G.I. Bill was the availability of employment and education counseling services through the Veterans Administration, designed to help veterans obtain education and training. To meet the high post-war demand, the VA not only maintained regional counseling centers but also contracted with educational institutions to operate an additional 300 sites (Brown, 1946) . It is probable that the availability of counseling services differed by race, especially in the South. Onkst (1998) students and 92 percent of the institutions had enrollment of less than 1000 students (Jenkins, 1946) . Under-funded and small, these institutions were largely excluded from the "university revolution" that swept through much of public higher education in the first part of the century-a development described by Goldin and Katz (1999) .
The small scale of the historically black institutions relative to other colleges and universities merits emphasis. While average enrollment at white or nonsegregated schools was 5 With the exception of Wilberforce University in Ohio and Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, these institutions were located in southern states with legalized educational segregation. The data collected by the Office of Education during the 1940s and 1950s does not record the attendance or degree completion of students by race at integrated colleges and universities.
6 The Second Morrill Act led to the founding of 17 Negro land-grant colleges in the southern and border states, with these institutions including Alabama A&M, University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, Southern University A&M (Louisiana), and Alcorn State (Mississippi). Many of these institutions emphasized training in crafts and trades following the "industrial education" philosophy of Booker T. Washington, rather than providing general nearly 1,500 in 1949-50, the average resident college enrollment at the black colleges was 729 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954). Beyond their much smaller size, colleges for blacks also had significantly fewer resources per student than their counterparts. Across all private and public institutions in the South, white institutions accounted for 92 percent of total expenditures in 1943-44; among public institutions alone, colleges and universities for whites accounted for more than 94 percent of expenditures (Jenkins, 1947, Table I ). In 1949-50, 56 percent of black men enrolled in black colleges were at public institutions, while 66 percent of all men attending college in southern states were at public institutions.
7 Because private schools were likely to be more limited than public institutions in their ability to expand capacity in response to demand shocks, the reliance of blacks in the South on private institutions for collegiate opportunities may have differentially affected their capacity to use G.I. benefits.
Excess demand for higher education was particularly high among black veterans in the South. Olson (1974) found that an estimated 20,000 black veterans were turned away from the Negro colleges, and a survey of 21 of the southern black colleges indicated that 55 percent of all veteran applicants were turned away for lack of space, compared to about 28 percent for all colleges and universities. Part of the problem was housing (Bolte and Harris, 1947) . For example, the lack of family housing units at the Tuskegee Institute in 1945 constituted a substantial barrier to black veteran enrollment as about a quarter of the school's veteran population were married and few were able to find alternative lodging (Onkst, 1998) .
education on the model of liberal arts colleges (Pifer, 1973) . 7 Data for enrollment at all southern institutions are from the Biennial Survey of Education 1948-50 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954) and the data for enrollment at colleges for blacks are from Bowles and DeCosta (1971) . While the level of enrollment expanded markedly at both public and private colleges for blacks between 1939-40 and 1949-50 , the growth at the public colleges was particularly marked. In 1939-40, enrollment of men at the private black colleges exceeded enrollment of men at the public black colleges, with enrollment levels of 6,724 and 6,528, respectively.
The historically black colleges were more limited than white colleges in their ability to accommodate returning servicemen because institutional resources were more scarce and deficiencies in physical space were often more serious than at the white institutions. Institutions expanding most rapidly at the end of the war were the public institutions with the economies of scale, scope, and funding of research universities (Stanley, 2001) . With very few of the historically black schools maintaining graduate or professional programs, they were ill- and South Carolina allowed some black enrollment (Johnson, 1954) . In this regard, the decade following World War II included significant changes in the range of colleges and universities attended by black Americans, as well as the level of collegiate attainment.
II. Estimation Framework
Our research questions focus on how World War II service, combined with the availability of G.I. benefits, changed collegiate outcomes and whether such effects differed for blacks and whites. First, even without the availability of educational benefits, veterans' post-war collegiate outcomes may have exceeded the attainment of non-veterans because veterans have had higher levels of college-preparedness in the absence of the war. Also, veterans may have acquired skills during military service that increased measured post-war educational attainment and civilian productivity. Moreover, the G.I. benefits reduced the direct cost of college through tuition payments and living stipends, thereby increasing the likelihood of college participation.
A central question of this analysis is whether the effect on collegiate attainment of military participation and the availability of educational benefits varied with race and geographic location. In fact, there is good reason to suspect that the return to education differs by race owing to discrimination in the labor market or differences in the quality of educational opportunities available to blacks and whites. Pressing in the other direction, if blacks were more likely to face credit constraints than whites, the addition of G.I. benefits might have somewhat larger effects on the enrollment behavior of blacks.
Still, this formulation presupposes the presence of elastic supply of enrollment places in the college market. The evidence discussed above suggests that black men residing in the South may have faced quite limited college enrollment options. The combination of de jure segregation at public institutions and limited capacity at private colleges may have limited the collegiate options for the large waive of returning black veterans in southern states.
As with a wide array of efforts to measure how a public policy initiative -in this case
World War II and the G.I. Bill -affect educational attainment, the key challenge is to measure a causal effect rather than to record the association between eligibility and educational outcomes.
Because veterans of both race groups are likely to differ systematically from non-veterans owing to the screening employed by the Armed Forces, simple comparisons of the educational attainment of veterans and non-veterans are likely to overstate the effects of military service and the availability of G.I. benefits on educational attainment. This is particularly true for black men, since a principal reason for rejection in this group was illiteracy. Thus, finding exogenous determinants of veteran status is of paramount concern.
Our strategy for estimating the effects of World War II service and the availability of G.I. benefits for black Americans is parallel to the regression discontinuity approach employed by Bound and Turner (2001) . One can imagine various strategies to estimate β. The simplest approach is to compare mean educational attainment between veterans and non-veterans for a cohort of individuals:
, where the overlines are used to represent sample means. It is clear that:
Page 13 The term in the square brackets represents the difference in the propensity to go to college of those that did and did not serve in the military. As long as selection into the military is nonrandom, this term is unlikely to be 0. However, given the nature of the exemptions from the draft that existed during World War II, we would expect that for the cohorts that served in World
War II, the term in brackets would be positive. As a result, the simple comparison between those who did serve and those who did not serve will exaggerate the causal effect of service on
The primary strategy we use to try to estimate β is to compare educational attainment across cohorts employing the methodology known in the evaluation literature as a regression discontinuity design. Starting with a time-homogeneous environment, that is, the α's and the distribution of the β's are constant across cohorts, consider the comparison of cohorts across time. Define d Ed as
, where the overlines represent averages across individuals within a specific cohort. Then:
The assumptions imply that the term in the second set of square brackets is 0. Comparing educational attainment for birth cohorts with significant service during World War II to birth cohorts that were born too late to serve [
as a consistent estimate of
indicates the probability that an individual is a veteran in the indicated birth cohort. More generally, suppose that
, but that anyone who served in the later period would have served during the earlier period and that no one who did not serve in the earlier period would have served during the later period. Formally we are assuming that:
Under this assumption, cross-cohort changes in educational attainment divided by cross-cohort changes in the fraction of the cohort serving identify the average effect of service for the population that would have served in one regime but not in the other -what Imbens and Angrist (1994) have referred to as the local average treatment effect (LATE).
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Prior to the start of the war, collegiate attainment followed an upward trajectory for blacks and whites. In this regard, it seems natural to assume that the α j 's increased over time. The inclusion of a linear time trend, which is allowed to vary by race, accounts for such secular change. Therefore, it is deviations from a trend that identify the effects of veteran status for both blacks and whites, with the model allowing different trends by race. It is also plausible that the distribution of β's might change over time. For example, individuals from cohorts that had, for the most part, started careers before being inducted would probably be less motivated to attend college on the G.I. Bill than would individuals drawn from cohorts that were inducted immediately out of high school. We address this issue by focusing, when possible, on comparisons between closely adjacent cohorts. In particular, we focus on cohorts that likely entered military service shortly after turning 18 (or shortly before, if they volunteered).
9 In this regard, condition (4) is exactly analogous to the monotonicity condition discussed by Imbens and Angrist (1994) . This empirical strategy closely follows much recent discussion of the estimation of causal effects. It has long been understood that under suitable assumptions comparisons over time could be used to eliminate selection bias (Heckman and Robb, 1985) . In effect, we are using cohort dummies to form an instrument for veterans' status. The connection between instrumental variables and time aggregation has been noted by various authors (e.g. Angrist, 1991; Moffitt, 1995) .
Estimates based on the population of white men may be very different than those for the population of black men for several reasons including different opportunity costs, returns to education in the labor market, and effects of military service.
10 Distinguishing the data by place of birth allows for the examination of the hypothesis that segregated educational institutions attenuated the impact of access to G.I. benefits for blacks from the South. 11 Yet, because there was a large migration of blacks from South to North in young adulthood during this period, a better test would be to identify outcomes of men born and residing in the South after demobilization in relation to men born and residing in the North after demobilization. While we do not observe this classification, we do observe state of residence in 1970 as well as state of birth. Comparing outcomes among men born and residing in the South in 1970 in relation to men born and residing in the North after 1970 produces similar outcomes to those reported in the subsequent section. However, the further stratification of the data for southern-born men, combined with the reduction in the Census sample size by 1/3 when place of birth and place of residence are considered, leads to large increases in estimated standard errors.
III. Empirical Results
As a starting point, it is useful to examine within-cohort differences in the educational attainment of veterans and non-veterans by race and birthplace. Tables 3 and 4 compare the   10 Collins (2001), as well as Margo (1995) , demonstrates that black economic progress during the war years was striking and blacks made particular employment gains in the manufacturing sector, leading to a substantial narrowing in the black-white wage gap in the decade between 1940 and 1950 (Maloney, 1994 . benefits on collegiate attainment. To the extent that blacks were more likely to be rejected from the military for illiteracy and other attributes associated with college readiness, blacks were more likely than whites to be rejected from the military for illiteracy, it is likely that this exaggeration is larger for blacks than for whites Between-cohort estimates for the educational outcomes of years of college and college completion are shown in Table 5 , for blacks and whites overall and then distinguished by birth for the 1923-28 birth cohorts.
13 Estimates in Table 5 reflect aggregate regressions (with each observation reflecting a quarter of birth average), although the exact instrumental variables analog is a micro-level regression using quarter-of-birth dummy variables to instrument for the endogeneity of veteran status. The overall estimates are strikingly smaller than the within-birth cohort estimates for both blacks and whites. For whites, the point estimates suggest an effect of World War II and the availability of G.I. benefits of about 0.14 years of college and about 3.5 percentage points in college completions. For blacks, the estimated average effects are similar in magnitude, though the confidence intervals are quite sizable.
Turning to the question of whether the effects on educational attainment of World War II service and the G.I. Bill were similar by region of birth, Figure 3 presents educational attainment by region for blacks and for whites. Within race groups, northern-born men have greater educational attainment at both the secondary and college levels. Turning to the regression estimates presented in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 , it is evident that, among white veterans, those from the South gained at least as much in collegiate attainment as those from outside the 13 Specification tests did not reveal evidence of serial correlation. For this reason, our standard errors are calculated under the assumption of independence of errors over time. Standard errors are also corrected for heteroskedasticity in accordance with an estimate of the variance matrix suggested by Huber -White.
South; the point estimates for white men born in the South are modestly larger though not in a statistically significant sense. For black veterans, however, those born outside the South experienced sizable gains at the collegiate level, while those from the South made no significant gains in educational attainment.
Expanding the range of birth cohorts used in the estimates helps to sharpen the analysis.
As shown in Table 6 , the point estimates of the effect of World War II participation and the availability of G.I. benefits on years of collegiate attainment do not change much with the addition of more years of observation. For non-southern blacks, these estimates range from .30
to .41 years of college and 6 to 8 percentage points for college completion. Moreover, the educational gains associated with World War II service and the availability of G.I. benefits are consistently indistinguishable from zero for southern-born black veterans. We are limited by the structure of the education question in the Census data to using years of completed educational attainment as our outcome variable, with this measure explicitly excluding non-degree credit enrollment. To the extent that much of the G.I. Bill training took alternative forms, it is conceivable that there are other interesting and important changes in skills brought about by the G.I. Bill not captured in this analysis.
To answer the question of whether the combination of World War II service and G.I.
benefits increased educational attainment, we need to compare the veterans to a "no service/no benefits" control group. Because men who did not serve in World War II were at risk for service in the Korean War and those who served in this later conflict were also eligible for educational benefits, the simple comparison of World War II veterans to non-World War II veterans will not accomplish this objective. The interval between the conclusion of World War II and the start of the Korean conflict is short and men from birth cohorts in the 1920s who did not serve in World War II were at increased risk of induction for service in Korea. For both black and white men, the manpower demands of the Korean conflict intersect the right tail of World War II service, as the youngest cohorts serving in World War II also participated in the Korean conflict (see Figure 1 ).
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To help control for the confounding effects of service in Korea on our estimates of the effect of World War II service on educational attainment, we first attempted to estimate the effects of Korean War service directly, but we find that the limitations in sample size preclude the estimation of our model with two endogenous variables. Instead, we considered a range of alternatives generated as the assumed magnitude of the Korean War effect changes. Table 7 presents results from estimates in which we have varied the Korean War service effect up to 0.5 in the case of years of college completed to 0.1 in the case of college completion. We also consider panels of alternative length, ranging from the 1923-28 interval of birth cohorts to the 1923-32 interval of birth cohorts. Plainly, the longer series yields more precise estimates, though the tradeoff is that the additional cohorts may have faced other appreciably different circumstances when making their educational investments.
Assuming positive effects of the Korean War on educational attainment pushes up the estimated effect of World War II service on educational attainment in a necessarily mechanical way. Yet, even at the high end of the range of predictions, the effects of World War II and the G.I. Bill on educational attainment remain more than twice as large for those born outside the South. Alternative estimates of the effect of the Korean War and the associated benefit program provide some guidance.
14 The service participation in the Korean War peaked at the last quarter of the 1931 birth cohort, as about 48% of black men and 65% of white men were veterans of this conflict. It is also the case that among men serviceeligible for both conflicts, blacks were somewhat more likely to serve in Korea than whites. For example, only 8 percent of white men born in early 1927 served in the Korean conflict but not World War II, whereas about 15 percent of black men in this cohort participated in the Korean conflict but not World War II.
In suggesting a preferred estimate among the ranges presented in Table 7 , one strategy is to look to alternative sources to pin down the magnitude of the Korean War effect for blacks. 15 An additional strategy for identifying the effect G.I. benefits available to Korean veterans on the education of blacks and whites and by region follows the approach identified by Stanley (2000) , which compares men commencing service before January 31, 1955 who are benefit-eligible to those who begin service thereafter and It is important to emphasize that the nature of our estimation strategy of using variation over time in military participation to identify deviations from a trend in collegiate attainment makes it difficult to distinguish the importance of competing interpretations. First, it is well documented that resources per student at the elementary and secondary levels were particularly low in segregated schools in southern states. As such, the low quality of schooling received by black veterans at the primary and secondary levels may have impeded opportunities to benefit from collegiate training through the G.I. Bill. benefits. Still, regardless of the level or type of training, we find little evidence that military are not benefit eligible. Data from the 1980 Census identifies veterans by birth cohort, race, place of birth, and the conflict in which they participated, though these data do not have the date of service commencement or rich covariates which are available in the OCG data employed by Stanley. Nevertheless, estimates using the sharp break in benefit eligibility in 1955 to identify the effect of the Korean War G.I. Bill on educational attainment of those men turning 18 near the start of service participation (the 1934-1939 birth cohorts) suggests that this program had a somewhat larger effect on the collegiate attainment of black men from the South than those born outside the South. However, these results are not estimated precisely enough to introduce in the text. 16 Card and Krueger (1992) provide substantial evidence on the narrowing in resource differences (e.g., the pupil teacher ratio) between schools for blacks and whites in the segregated states which started early in the 20 th Century and continued through the years when the World War II cohorts were enrolled in school. Differences between black and white students from the South in the change in school resources are captured in the race-specific time trends. Card and Krueger (1992) also present evidence on the differential return to education for blacks and whites, with blacks from states with particularly large differences in educational resources by race also experiencing lower returns to education. Differences in elementary and secondary school quality combined with discrimination in the labor market may well have lowered the expected return to college for black veterans from the South.
17 In addition to the limitations in physical capacity, the inability to expand the faculty may have severely affected the supply response of colleges for blacks in the South. Thompson (1946) highlights this problem noting that, not only did the war itself limit the supply of prospective young faculty, but able men were often taking advantage of the G.I. Bill to obtain advanced degrees and salaries at the black colleges were quite low and these institutions were unable to compete in the faculty labor market with colleges and universities in the North and West.
service and the availability of education benefits changed skill acquisition of black veterans from the South. Ideally, we would be able to do more to distinguish the hypothesis that low elementary and secondary school quality reduced the expected return to college for black veterans from the South from the hypothesis that limitations in collegiate supply restricted attainment of black veterans from the South. We have stratified the southern sample along the lines of school quality and included veteran status interacted with state-level school quality measures in our estimation. There is not evidence that states with poor elementary-secondary schools have smaller educational gains associated with the G.I. Bill, but the standard errors are large enough that we are unable to put much weight on these results. While it is hard to pin down whether the low quality of the segregated southern schools directly reduced educational gains made available by the G.I. Bill, there is ample evidence from the historical record that the limited supply response of colleges and universities in the segregated states reduced the educational gains of black veterans from the South.
IV. Discussion
How the G.I. Bill affected the level of education among men from different races and backgrounds is an important question in both educational history and public policy analysis.
Models of educational investment suggest that the benefit provisions associated with the G.I. Bill might well be expected to have a larger effect on the average educational outcomes of blacks than whites, owing to lower opportunity costs and the potentially larger relative reduction in credit constraints.
18 For white men, the combination of World War II service and the availability of G.I. benefits had substantial positive effects on collegiate attainment, and these effects were similar in magnitude for men born in different geographic regions. For black men, we find that the effect of military service and the availability of the G.I. Bill differs markedly between men born in the southern states and those born elsewhere, with former experiencing appreciably little gain in educational attainment in comparison to the latter. Beyond collegiate attainment, noncollegiate vocational and technical training was a major component of the World War II G.I. Bill, with more veterans receiving training in these institutions than in colleges. Yet, available evidence does not suggest that this avenue was a substitute for collegiate participation among black men born in the South. Rather, black men in the South also had a particularly difficult time gaining access to vocational and on-the-job training programs with G.I. benefits (Onkst, 1998) . The results of this analysis illustrate some of the potential pitfalls associated with decentralized federal initiatives. Contemporary advocates for choice-based reform in education have often trumpeted the success of the G.I. Bill, using its favorable effects as a motivation for vouchers (Hauptman, 1999 ). Yet, this analysis indicates that state-level policies and conditions may undermine the equal distribution of such programs. The structure of the G.I. Bill ceded the responsibility for overseeing and administering many of the educational benefits to the states (Onkst, 1998) . Congress did not create a set of uniform standards for implementation nor was there a regulatory mechanism to ensure equal access to program benefits. As a result, the intersection of federal programs such as the G.I. Bill with significantly different state policies yielded substantial interstate differences in outcomes.
The availability of benefits to black veterans had a substantial and positive impact on the educational attainment of those likely to have access to colleges and universities outside the South. Unfortunately, for those more likely to be limited to the South in their collegiate choices, the G.I. Bill exacerbated rather than narrowed the economic and educational differences between blacks and whites. In classifying states geographically into "non-South" and "South" in this analysis, our aim is to distinguish those states with legislatively enforced segregation. While 17 states maintained some form of segregation in higher education at the start of World War II, such a broad classification misses substantial variation within these states in the degree to which race limited higher educational opportunities across states. In terms of empirical analysis, the capacity to make finely grained distinctions about the outcomes of blacks at 19 A somewhat different set of questions is available on the 5% and the 15% questionnaires, with the 15% questionnaire including the items on veteran status.
The use of data from the 1970 Census in this analysis rather than data from the 1980 Census is motivated by the observation that for cohorts born during the 1920s and 1930s the 1980 census shows substantially higher levels of educational attainment than does the 1970 census. These differences presumably have more to do with differential mortality, education inflation, and adult participation in college than the lingering effects of war service. Tables 89-93, 171-175, Selective Service and Victory (1948) . Notes: Column (2), Classification I-C indicates currently enlisted or deceased; Column (3); Classification I-C D indicates discharged; Column (4) I-A indicates available for service; Column (6) IV-F indicates deferred for mental or physical unfitness; Column (7) II-A and II-B deferment for nonagricultural employment; and Column (8) II-C captures agricultural employment as well as other miscellaneous deferment categories. 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 Year and Quarter of Birth 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 Year and Quarter of Birth 
